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WVASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
as authority for the rule, avoid the issue, since, according to the terms
of the corporate charters in those proceedings, the power to call a
meeting of the stockholders was expressly vested in the board of direc-
tors. However, the president and secretary of a church were held to be
without authority to issue a call in a Louisiana case16 preceding the
Knoll decision.
The Wilbur case illustrates the hazard of incorporating under RCW
24.08.010 et seq., a short, inadequate, and antiquated chapter relating
to educational, religious, benevolent, or charitable societies. If the
Wilbur Mission Church had been incorporated under RCW 24.04.010
et seq., relating to nonprofit, nonstock corporations, the conflict would
probably have been averted by the requirement that the members of
the corporation must meet and adopt bylaws before transacting any
business. The time, place, and manner of calling and conducting meet-
ings heads the list of suggested bylaw provisions under RCW 24.04.070.
Also, RCW 24.16.010 et seq., relating to associations for mutual bene-
fit and educational, charitable, etc., purposes, would have been a better
choice under which to incorporate than the one employed. Among other
provisions the statute provides for adoption of bylaws and delineates
the authority of trustees. Both RCW 24.04 and 24.16 are broad in
scope, and yet lend a degree of guidance to incorporators and a partial
framework from which the corporation may function. This cannot be
said of RCW 24.08.
WiLLiAM D. CAMERON
Corporations May Do Business Under Assumed Names. Seattle Association of Credit
Men v. Green, 145 Wash. Dec. 128, 273 P2d 513 (1954), was an action by the assignee
for benefit of all creditors of an insolvent corporation against certain specific creditors
of the corporation to recover a preferential payment. The Supreme Court held the
Uniform Business Corporation Act, (adopted 1933, RCW Title 23), does not preclude
a corporation from doing business under an assumed name. Funds of the insolvent
corporation, paid within four months of the corporation's assignment for benefit of
creditors by means of a check drawn under an assumed name used in transacting
business with a creditor, could be recovered by the assignee under RCW 23.48.030.
CREDITORS' RIGHTS
Mechanics' Liens-Time for Filing of Claim. The filing of mechan-
ics' liens is governed in Washington by a statute which, in the part
pertinent to this inquiry, reads as follows:
No lien created by this chapter shall exist and no action to enforce the
16 State ex rel. Bellamore v. Rombotis, 120 La. 150, 45 So. 43 (1907).
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same shall be maintained, unless within ninety days from the date of the
cessation of the performance of such labor or of furnishing of such ma-
terials, a claim for such lien shall be filed for record as hereinafter
provided... (Emphasis added.)'
This choice of a criterion for the determination of the beginning of
the period of limitation is less than happy, as the exact amount at which
work on a construction contract ceases is usually very difficult to
ascertain, especially since we have to deal not only with the main
contract but with the individual performances of sub-contractors and
materialmen. The court was never squarely faced with the problem
when the period of limitation for sub-contractors and materialmen
begins, but the wording of the statute forces the conclusion that each
individual performance under sub-contracts is considered separately.
This conclusion is strengthened by inferences drawn from two cases.
In Rieflin v. Grafron2 the court considered the timeliness of the filing
of a materialman's lien. The whole discussion, by counsel, by the trial
court and by the Supreme Court dealt only with the time of the plain-
tiff's performance with no reference to the main contract at all. In a
recent case when discussing a materialman's lien the court said, "The
remainder of the material was delivered between December 15 and
December 30, 1949. Pioneer had ninety days from the latter date in
which to file a lien."' It is the opinion of the present writer that this
construction not only agrees with the statutory language, but is also
preferable as it gives full protection to the materialman and at the
same time fulfills the purpose of the period of limitation in preventing
the filing of stale claims.
It may be of interest to compare statutes from several other jurisdic-
tions which deal with this problem. The Arizona statute provides
for filing within ninety days for main contractors and within sixty days
for sub-contractors and materialmen, the period of limitation starting
for everybody with the completion of a structure or alteration. This
statute has been construed with respect to sub-contractors in Lesson v.
Bartol.5 The Colorado statute' provides for the filing of the construc-
tion contract within five days from the start of the construction and
I RCW 60.04.060 (1).
2 63 Wash. 387, 115 Pac. 851 (1911).
3 West v. Jarvi, 44 Wn2d 241, 249; 266 P.2d 1040, 1045 (1954).
4 § 62-202, A.C.A. 1939.
555 Ariz. 160, 99 P2d 485 (1940). In determining timeliness of filing of material-.
mar's lien, the court established the time when the main contract was finished, which
was over 6 months after last delivery of materials.
686 C.S.A. c. 3 § 1:
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such contract operates as a lien for all those performing services or
furnishing materials under it. The lien must be foreclosed within six
months after completion.7 The Oregon statute8 provides for the filing
of liens by machinists, lumber merchants, laborers, etc. within thirty
days from the completion of the construction.
On the other hand Oklahoma, whose statute resembles the Washing-
ton statute much more than any of the above, provides that material-
men and sub-contractors perfect their lien ". . . by filing . . .within
60 days after the date upon which material was last furnished or labor
last performed under such sub-contract. . . ."' This statute was con-
strued in a recent case"0 where the court held that a subcontractor
who did not file within sixty days from the cessation of his performance
had no standing to intervene in an action brought by the main con-
tractor to foreclose his lien.
Returning to Washington law we find that the court has repeatedly
been faced with the problem of determining on which date the last
labor was performed or the last materials delivered by a lien claimant.
Out of these decisions some definite guideposts for the prediction of
results in future litigation have emerged.
The court has held that the lien was not timely filed where the last
delivery was made pursuant to a new contract with a different party
and based on a new consideration." Similarly, where the last delivery
consisted of materials which were not used in the construction of the
building to be charged with the lien, the court has held that the last
delivery of materials actually used in construction should be used for
computation of the time of filing. 2 Also where the court found that
the additional work was not done in good faith in furtherance of the
7 86 C.S.A. c. 3 § 10.
8 § 87:035, Oregon L.A., construed in Eastern and Western Lumber Co. v. Wil-
liams, 129 Ore. 1, 276 Pac. 257 (1929).
9 42 O.S. 1941 § 143.
10 Acme Glass Co. v. Owens, 204 Okla. 601, 232 P.2d 624 (1951).
11 Pacific Manufacturing Co. v. Brown, 8 Wash. 347, 36 Pac. 273 (1894). Plaintiff
materialman stopped delivery on March 6 and refused to continue unless paid in cash
or unless additional security given. Certain third parties interested financially in the
construction started negotiations with plaintiff, who as a result made one further
delivery on Marcl 23 for which he was given the third party's note which was paid at
maturity. Held, lien filed on June 12 not timely.
12 Petro Paint Mfg. Co. v. Taylor, 147 Wash. 158, 265 Pac. 155 (1928). The court
found that the delay was not justified and the small amount of cement delivered was
not used in the house. The court said that the last delivery was not made in good faith
but solely for the purpose of extending time of filing. Kellison v. Godfrey, 154 Wash.
219, 281 Pac. 733 (1929). Plaintiff supplied defendant, a contractor, with materials for
several houses. The house in question was sold to co-defendants who were told that
there were no encumbrances. Held, that as last delivery of materials was made after
the house was completed lien, filed within ninety days from this delivery, was not timely.
Cf, Warming v. Hargi, 159 Wash. 501, 294 Pac. 248 (1930).
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contract, but for the purpose of extension of the filing time, a lien filed
within ninety days of such additional work was not timely.' Where a
contractor had stopped work and refused to proceed because of the
owner's financial irresponsibility unless paid in cash or given additional
security, the time for filing started running from the moment of refusal
to proceed further with the construction. " The court has also been
very explicit in its refusal to permit extension of filing time by a suc-
cession of repair jobs, after the actual construction had been completed,
and expressed its views as follows: "To permit the extension of the
time for filing a lien, by the process of tacking on subsequent small,
casual, and unrelated repairs, could create an intolerable condition
not within the.spirit or purpose of the lien law." 5 Thus the last work
performed or delivery made, to qualify under the statutory provision,
must be a bona fide effort in furtherance of the contract and cannot
be too far removed in time from the previous deliveries." However,
delay alone was not decisive where the court found that the contract
did not specify any time for completion and the delay was not caused
by bad faith."'
The court has upheld the claimant's right to a lien where the addi-
tional work was done to remedy a defect" or to replace defective
materials." The same result has been reached where some adjustments
I8 Swensson v. Carlton; 17 Wnf2d 396, 135 P2d 450 (1943). Plaintiff veneered the
house and built two fireplaces. Thereafter, at the owner's request, he cleaned a fireplace
left dirty by the plasterers. Held, this was an independent contract which did not
extend filing time. The request for cleaning was disputed by the owner and the court
was of the opinion that the cleaning job was done foir the purpose of extending filing,
time. See also, Petro Paint Mfg. Co. v. Taylor, .upra note 12.
"1 Dower Lumber Co. v. MacCammon, 141 Wash. 381, 250 Pac. 107 (1926).
25 Brown v. Mychel Co., 186 Wash. 97, 56 P.2d 1020 (1936). Plaintiff remodelled
the building and adapted it to a changed purpose, and thereafter for a period of five
years did all repairs. Held, repairs did not extend time for filing.
16 Ellsworth v. Layton, 37 Wash. 340, 79 Pac. 947 (1905). The building was ac-
cepted as completed in October, a lien filed in April not timely, notwithsteading that
on January 6 metallic flashings were put over six windows, which had been in-
advertently omitted and on February 13 certain drain tile was relaid. The defects were
not apparent. The court accepted the findings below in a per curiam opinion.
17 Rose v. O'Reilly, 138 Wash. 19, 224 Pac. 124 (1926).
18 Osten v. Curtis, 133 Wash. 360, 233 Pac. 643 (1925). Work of repairing house
completed in the main on July 30, but a small repair of corner of foundation done at
owner's request on October 15; lien filed on December 11. American Plumbing and
Steam Supply Co. v. Alavekln, 154 Wash. 436, 282 Pac. 917 (1929). Plaintiff installed
new heating system which proved unsatisfactory. Plaintiff thereafter.installed a new
boiler, without charge for labor or materials. Held, time for filing ran from the time
when the new boiler was installed. Kirk v. Rohan, 29 Wn.2d 432, 187 P2d 607 (1947).
In this case plaintiff furnished labor and materials, at owner's request, two and a half
months after apparent completion of garage and occupation by owner, to prevent flood
water from backing up. The cburt added a dictum that a new and independent contract
does not extend filing time.
19 Rieflin v. Grafron, supra note 2. Plaintiff delivered door and windows between
March 2 and June 2, but on August 8 delivered two or three additional glass panes to
replace defective ones. Held. lien filed on October 14 was within the ninety day period.
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were made on a furnace and it was started for the first time.2" Where
a bridge built by the plaintiff had been certified as substantially com-
pleted on July 12, but some additional planking, which could not have
been done before because of high water, had been done in September,
the court held that a lien filed in October was timely. 1 Also in more
recent cases the delivery of a small additional item or a small altera-
tion 3 were held to constitute the date upon which performance ceased.
Similarly, where three buildings were constructed on the same tract
for a common purpose and the plaintiff had no notice that they were
to be treated as separate contracts, a lien filed within ninety days after
the last delivery of materials for the third building was timely as to all
three.2"
In many of these cases the court stressed the element of good faith
on the part of the claimant. Some of the cases are difficult to reconcile
on the facts, but accepting the court's findings the analysis is con-
sistent. However, there are in the cases several dicta which require
further analysis, because of the court's decision in two cases decided
in 1954.
In Hopkins v. Smith" the court found that the plaintiff, a contractor,
had been remodeling the premises which were to be sold as a speculative
venture, that he abandoned the work in November, 1951 after the
defendant refused to pay one half of the expenses, that at the request
of the defendant he installed two wooden steps on February 4, 1952.
The court held that a lien filed on April 2, 1952, could not be foreclosed
as it was past the ninety day period of limitation; the court found as
2oFriis v. Brown, 37 Wn2d 457, 224 P2d 330 (1950). Plaintiff contracted with
defendant to install a furnace and after installation did nothing from June 4 to Septem-
ber 23, when he went to defendant's house, made some adjustments and started the
furnace. Held, lien filed on September 28 timely. The court said that the work was
done in good faith in the furtherance of the contract.
21 Washington Bridge Co. v. Land and River Improvement Co., 12 Wash. 272,
40 Pac. 982 (1895).22 Lofthus v. Cumming, 198 Wash. 115, 87 P2d 283 (1939). Delivery of materials
was finished on November 30. The court found that on December 14 a small sash,
value $1.53, was delivered. Held, filing of lien on March 9 timely.
23 Flint v. Bronson, 197 Wash. 686, 86 P2d 218 (1939). The additional work in-
volved in this case was the change of a fixed glass window in front door to make a"wicket," at the cost of $1.55. Cf. Building Supplies, Inc. v. Gillingham, 17 Wn.2d 489,
135 P.2d 832 (1943). Owner employed plaintiff on March 1 to plaster outside walls,
which task was completed on April 26. Thereafter owner re-employed plaintiff on
on June 13 to plaster inside of building which was completed about July 5; the lien
was filed on August 21. The court accepted the trial court's finding that only one con-
tract was involved.
24 Standard Lumber Co. v. Fields, 29 Wn2d 327, 187 P2d 283 (1947).
25 Compare Ellsworth v. Layton, supra note 16, with Kirk v. Rohan, supra note 18,
and Friis v. Brown, supra note 20.
26145 Wash. Dec. 511, 276 P2d 732 (1954).
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a matter of fact that the addition of the two steps was done under a
new and independent contract. The only case relied on by the court
was Swensson v. Carlton. In an attempt to set up a standard for
similar occasions, the court thus formulated the test:
If work is done or materials are furnished to complete the original
contract, or remedy some defect in the work or materials furnished under
the original contract, then such work or the furnishing of additional
materials extends the time of filing a lien. If, however, the work is done
or materials are furnished under a new and independent agreement, made
after the original contract or continuing employment is ended, then such
work or the furnishing of additional materials does not set the time
running so as to preserve a lien for the earlier work.28
However, earlier in 1954 the court was faced with this problem
in Powell v. Kier," where the plaintiff filed a lien for plumbing. The
plaintiff had installed the plumbing on the lower floor and completed
the work. Six weeks later the plans of the house were changed and
a second story was added, the plaintiff again installing the plumbing.
The parties segregated the costs of the two jobs. The court held
that a lien filed within the statutory period after the completion of
the second job covered both stories, saying that they must be con-
sidered as one for the purpose of computing the time for filing, The
facts of the case, as reported, are meager and it is impossoble to draw
any very general conclusions as it is not stated whether the main
construction contract was modified to include a second story, or
whether it was also a separate contract. However, the important thing
is that the only case relied on by the court was Building Supplies, Inc.
v. Gillingham° where the court, after accepting the finding of the lower
court that there had been only one contract, intimated in a dictum that
even if there had been two separate contracts the result would have
been the same, saying, "It should be noted that if there were two con-
tracts, they were between the same parties, for the same type of work,
on the same structure and that the time for filing a claim of lien had not
run on the first before the second had begun."'" This dictum is in direct
conflict with the test set up in Hopkins v. Smith.2
As authority for the dictum in the Building Supplies case the court
27 Supra note 13.
28145 Wash. Dec. 511, 514, 276 P2d 732, 734 (1954).
2944 Wn2d 174, 265 P2d 1059 (1954).
30 Supra note 23.




used Flint v. Bronson"8 into which it read the existence of two separate
contracts as follows:
We think our own case of Flint v. Bronson, 197 Wash. 686, 86 P.2d 218
is controling. This is a very clear case of two contracts, the second one
having been made to provide for a slight change in the work already
completed, by a new owner who had just bought the property. The
alteration amounted to only $1.55. Separateness of the two contracts
is beyond all question. The lien was filed within 90 days after the
change, but altogether too late to save the items under the main con-
tract if any distinction were to be observed.14
If this interpretation of the Flint case represents the Washington
rule, then it is in direct conflict with the Swensson and Hopkins cases,
as well as with dicta in numerous other cases.
The only way to analyze all these cases is to say that in its quest
for the date of cessation of performance of labor or delivery of ma-
terials, the court has been strongly influenced by the facts of each
case-note the court's repeated insistance on the good faith of the
claimant or the defendant-and if it finds the claim meritorious, it
is prepared to find that a later performance was part of the contract,
than in the case of a disputed claim or a claimant whose good faith
is doubted. The single contract-separate contracts test seems to be
a way of labelling results rather than of reaching them. In the same
way the sometimes used expression that something did or did not
extend the time for filing, must be understood to mean that a certain
act, work or delivery, was part of the contract and performance did
not cease until it was done, as it would be difficult to see how any-
thing short of a legislative amendment could extend a statutory period
of limitation. Viewed this way, the dicta in the Building Supplies
case mean probably no more than in certain situations, because of
the merits of the claim and close relation of both contracts, the court
will not consider the job as completed until the second contract is
finished.
The statute has been on the books in its present form since 1893
and it seems to be ripe for legislative revision. The vague test of
"9cessation" results in uncertainty and poses difficult problems of con-
struction, as well as of fact finding. Its replacement by a more concrete
and easily applied criterion would go a long way towards simplifying
this important area of lien law. In order to have a more objective
33 Supra note 23. The decision in this case was based on a determination of the time
when performance ceased and did not discuss two contracts.
34 17 Wn.2d 489, 493, 135 P.2d 832, 834 (1943).
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criterion it could be required in the case of sub-contractors and mater-
ialmen that they obtain upon completion of their task a certificate
from the main contractor or preferably from the architect and that
the date of such certificate would be used in computing filing time.
In the alternative they could be required to give the owner notice
of completion, similar to the notice of commencement of performance"5
and that the date of such notice shall be conclusive. In the case of
the main contractor the date of the architect's certificate could be
made conclusive. As an alternative the- provisions of the Oregon
statute" could be studied. This statute provides that in the case of
unfinished construction a sixty days interruption is conclusively pre-
sumed to show abandonment and the owner by filing a notice and
posting a copy prominently upon the property sets the period of
limitation in motion. A similar procedure in the case of any con-
struction contract would be one way of establishing an objective date
from which the period of limitation could be computed.
RicH~AR W. BARTE
Creditors' Rights--Mechanics' Liens--Filing More Than One Lien. One of the
issues in the case of West v. Tarzis, 44 Wn2d 241, 266 P.2d 1040 (1954), was the
validity of a second lien filed by Pioneer Sand & Gravel Co. for building supplies.
Pioneer gave notice of their intention to claim a lien (RCW 60.04.020) within the
statutory five-day limit from the date of beginning of delivery. The lien was duly filed,
but by mistake, for an amount far less than the balance due. The defendant paid this
amount and Pioneer executed a release. Thereupon the mistake was discovered and a
second lien was filed for the balance due, still within the ninety days from the date of
the last delivery (RCW 60.04.060). The defendant argued that the previous release
exhausted the force and effect of the notice. The court said: "The filing of a lien by
a materialman for less than the amount due, and the satisfaction of that lien, do not
affect the force and effect of the notice given in conformity with RCW 60.04.020, and
a second lien covering the amount still due will be enforced if filed within the statutory
period following the last delivery of materials, in the absence of cricumstances con-
stituting an estoppel." The case while novel in the field of security transactions and
statutory liens, applies well known contract principles, that a release given under a
mistake of fact does not operate as full discharge. See, for instance, Contractor's
Machinery & Storage Co. v. Stewart, 177 Wash. 263, 31 P.2d 546 (1934), and authori-
ties cited therein. An exhaustive collection of authorities on the subject from other
jurisdictions can be found in 6 CoaRBi, CoxmAcTs § 1292 (1951).
Judgments Valid at Time of Death of Judgment Debtor-Statute of limitations.
In Morrison v. Hulbert, 44 Wn2d 171, 266 P.2d 338 (1954), the court construed
RCW 11.40.130 for the first time in relation to judgments. The final judgment in the
plaintiff's favor was entered on January 22, 1946; the judgment debtor died on Sep-
85 RCW 60.04.020.
26 § 87:045, Oregon L.A.
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tember 22, 1951, the judgment being still unsatisfied; the administratrix, the defendant,
was appointed on November 8, 1951, and published the notice to creditors of the estate
on March 28, 1952; the plaintiff filed his claim on September 26, 1952-six years and
eight months after judgment. The court has heretofore interpreted the statute of
limitations concerning judgments in litigation involving a living judgment debtor.
This statute, RCW 4.56.210 & 220, has been construed not only to bar the remedy but
to extinguish the substantive right, Hutton v. State, 25 Wn.2d 402, 171 P.2d 248 (1946).
Further, by judicial interpretation the operation of the statute is not tolled by the
absence of the judgment debtor from the jurisdiction. Hemen v. Reinhard, 45 Wash. 1,
87 Pac. 953 (1906). In affirming a judgment for the plaintiff the court, in the principal
case, said, "We hold that, in the event of the death of a judgment debtor, this section
[RCW 11.40.130] applies to the exclusion of all other statutes, so that a claim, valid
at the date of his death, must be allowed as a valid claim against his estate provided it
is filed in accordance with RCW 11.40.010... " This decision clarifies the law in this
particular and puts judgments on the same footing with all other claims against the
estate, so far as the time of presentation is concerned, and thus helps to prevent
injustice.
CRIMINAL LAW
Perjury-What is Necessary to Constitute a Valid Oath in Wash-
ington. Due to the numerous situations in which statements must
be made under oath the question of what constitutes a valid oath
is one of practical importance. In a recent decision' the Washington
Supreme Court said:
It is a matter of common knowledge that in many instances, notaries
acknowledge signatures to claims, affidavits, depositions, and verifica-
tions without the signer actually being present, and also that quite
often, when the signer is present, nothing is said about an oath and no
thought is given to it whatever, thus raising a serious doubt as to
whether a solemn oath had actually been administered by the notary
and taken by the signer.
2
Whether a valid oath has or has not been given is a question that
frequently arises in a criminal action for perjury. Is proof of the
defendant's signature and of the signature of the acknowledging
officer sufficient to show the allegedly false statements were made
under oath? There seems to be no clean-cut answer to this question
by the Washington court.
In State v. Dodd,3 the defendant, a public official,, was charged
with perjury for falsifying several monthly claims for expenses.5 The
1 State v. Heyes, 44 Wn.2d 579, 269 P.2d 577 (1954).
2 Id. at 587, 269 P.2d at 582.
3 193 Wash. 26, 74 P.2d 497 (1937).
4 Defendant was the King County Engineer during 1936.
5 Eleven expense account claims, one for each month except February, formed the
basis of the charge.
[MAY
